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In the Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, we find Wittgenstein 
exclaiming: ‘Contradiction. Why this one bogey? This is surely very suspicious.’ 
(Wittgenstein, 1967, III 56). During one of his early discussions with members of the 
Vienna circle, he is claimed to have made the following prediction: ‘I am prepared to 
predict that there will be mathematical investigations of calculi containing 
contradictions and people will pride themselves on having emancipated themselves 
from consistency too.’ (Goldstein 1989, p. 540).1 
Some readers of Wittgenstein follow Wrigley in viewing him as proposing a 
radical conventionalist philosophy of contradictions – not only of contradictions but 
of practically everything (Wrigley 1980, Wright 1980, Review 1977). According to 
this view, the only way of making sense of his remarks on contradictions is to assume 
that he endorsed a conventional idea of necessity. Any instance of necessary truths in 
Wittgenstein’s later writings is, according to this account, a result of something a 
group of people set up. It is a feature of a linguistic practice that owes its existence 
                                                          
1 Wittgenstein’s remarks bearing on contradiction are scattered in a number places. For example 
Wittgenstein 1967, II 78, 81, 82; III 57-60; III 87; V 12, 13, 21, 26, 28. For further details, see 
Priest, Routley, Norman 1989; Priest and Smiley 1993; Priest 1998. 
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purely to a conscious or unconscious congruence of a way of behaving. Mathematics, 
according to this view, is essentially a game whose rules are conventional.  
The prediction of Wittgenstein regarding contradictions should therefore be 
seen as a conjecture about ways of acting, about agreed tastes. For instance, at one 
point, Wittgenstein describes how contradictions that are evident in what people do 
and say do not always produce catastrophic effects. He states that ‘people do not get 
into those troubles’ (Wittgenstein 1976, 288). According to people like Wrigely, the 
reason that no trouble arises is simply that, in some situations, people have adopted 
certain conventions. According to such conventions, contradictions are not as 
problematic as they are in the typical language-games used by logicians and 
mathematicians.  
It is worthwhile highlighting the link between Wittgenstein’s views on 
contradictions and his more general views on mathematics. The former views are 
rightly seen as a subset of the latter. Commentators like Wrigley are probably 
applying the alleged Wittgensteinian conventionalism in mathematics to the particular 
case of contradictions. To take the bull by the horns therefore, one needs to see 
whether Wittgenstein’s conventionalism in mathematics is indeed as radical as 
Wrigley suggests. 
Consider the case of a mathematical proof. What constitutes a proof? The 
reply attributed to Wittgenstein is in line with his fundamental position on rule-
following. According to this, the ultimate source of normativity in rule-following is 
located in the community as it engages in a given practice. For him therefore, it seems 
natural to hold that a mathematical proof is neither a novel application of established 
rules, nor a discovery of hidden mathematical structures. It is a creative way of 
changing a common inclination among the community of specialists (Wittgenstein 
1967, IV 30, VII 9; 1979 p. 185-6). This change of inclination involves the act of 
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convincing others of something they had never imagined before. The mathematician 
originator of a new mathematical proof or concept has the task of doing something 
that will convince his colleagues that what he does is essentially supplying a proof. 
For example, when mathematicians allegedly proved that denumerable infinity, ℵ0 , is 
a number, they went through a procedure that convinced their colleagues that they 
have indeed supplied a proof. The proof itself is part of the novelty. 
Not everything is allowed, however. In fact, for this particular example, 
Wittgenstein thinks mathematicians are mistaken whenever they use the expression 
‘the number of elements in an infinite series’ as if it had a clear meaning. He thinks 
that the use of ℵ0 as a number is an inappropriate grammatical inclination. His 
judgement here shows that he did not consider the criterion for acceptance or rejection 
of novelty a simple democratic process of establishing the major trends in the various 
communities of mathematicians. There is an important aspect that distinguishes him 
from the pure conventionalist. For him, the criterion for acceptance or rejection of 
novelty is the legitimacy of subtle changes in the meaning of central symbols used. A 
community of mathematicians cannot just decide for itself what meaning certain 
symbols or phrases have. Meaning, as manifested in the use of words, is like a net 
reaching out beyond any one community.2 
The upshot of the line of reasoning I am taking is that pure conventionalism, 
of a completely arbitrary kind, is a mistaken characterisation of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of mathematics. If this is a mistaken characterisation of his philosophy of 
mathematics, it is very probably a mistaken characterisation of his discussion of 
                                                          
2 It is a grammatical mistake to say that ‘has ℵ0 elements’ is equivalent to the ordinary phrase ‘has p 
elements’ (Frascolla 1994, chap 3). This non-equivalence itself however is a matter of semantics, 
and thus embedded on the practice of the community. Any practice is always somewhat 
constrained. Some constraints are conventional; others can be called non-conventional. These latter 
are due to how the world is and determine what Wittgenstein calls ‘natural history’ (Wittgenstein 
1953, § 415). Cf. Caruana 2000, chapter 7. Normativity and rule-following is discussed in more 
detail in Caruana 2003. 
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contradictions as well. It would be very odd for him to lapse into radical 
conventionalism only for the question of contradictions. The problem however is: if 
not pure conventionalism, then what? Pure conventionalism seems to be the easy way 
out. What I propose is to examine the possibility of building on the framework 
suggested by Wittgenstein towards a non-conventional version of the logic of 
contradiction. The suggestion that Wittgenstein himself would have liked to develop 
his views in this direction gains some support from some scattered comments of his, 
the most significant of which perhaps is the following: 
‘But you can’t allow a contradiction to stand: Why not? We do sometimes use 
this form in our talk, of course not often – but one could imagine a technique of 
language in which it was a regular instrument. It might for example be said of an 
object in motion that it existed and did not exist in this place; change might be 
expressed by means of a contradiction’ (Wittgenstein 1967, V 8). 
‘Of course not often,’ he says. This is because the major threat from admitting 
contradictions is that of explosion. Standard logic cannot handle inconsistency. We 
define a theory as a set of axioms together with all their logical consequences. We can 
therefore say that a theory is inconsistent when it contains at least one single 
proposition together with its negation. From an inconsistent theory, one can deduce 
any proposition whatsoever.3 Consequently, one says that standard logic is explosive 
                                                          
3 Starting from the premise P that A & ∼A, one can see how any other proposition follows because of 
the following simple argument. For all A, A ⇒ (A or B). From P, however, we hold also that ∼A. 
(A or B) & ∼A ⇒ B. Therefore we can conclude that B, for any B whatsoever. For the classical 
treatment of contradiction see Aristotle Metaphysics Book Γ : ‘A thing cannot at the same time be 
and not be’ (996b30). This formulation is related to the being of a thing, rather than to what one can 
say about the thing. Following Aristotle, many have considered the principle of contradiction, or of 
non-contradiction, depending on the way one looks at it, as valid for all being. In Aristotelian 
metaphysics, it is considered a primary principle, an indispensable tool, because it allows the 
apprehension of being in its intrinsic intelligibility (e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. 1a 2ae 
94,2). Since it excludes its own negation, it cannot be denied, but neither can it be derived. There 
are indications that Aristotle wasn’t ignorant of the explosive nature of even a single inconsistency 
in one’s belief system. For instance, he claims that ‘if words have no meaning, our reasoning with 
one another, and indeed with ourselves, has been annihilated; for it is impossible to think of 
anything if we do not think of one thing’ (Metaphysics, 1006b 8-10). See also: Dancy 1975. 
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in the presence of inconsistency. Inconsistency therefore is not a matter of degree. 
One instance of inconsistency within a theory destabilises the system completely. Is 
this, however, all there is to say as regards contradictions? If the answer is yes, then 
Wittgenstein’s remarks can be seen as musings about an impossible wonderland. If, 
however, the answer is no, then perhaps some valuable conclusions can be drawn by 
following his lead.  
The main problem is to see how to avoid the explosive situation described 
above. The suggestion I will be examining is the following. It is possible to talk 
intelligently about a situation containing a contradiction if one devises a way of 
‘containing’ the contradiction. That will ensure that it does not spill over to disrupt 
the entire universe of discourse. This may be called a ‘containment account’ of 
contradictions. If I show that such an account is plausible, I will also be thereby 
showing that Wittgenstein’s prediction is not to be discarded as deviant non-sense but 
as the seed of fruitful creativity. 
The best way to arrive at a plausible containment account, is perhaps to start at 
the logical studies of dialectic carried out by Rescher and Brandon (Rescher and 
Brandon 1980; see also Haack 1982; Denyer 1989). Rescher starts by determining a 
crucial distinction to be made in any serious attempt at dealing with contradictions. 
This distinction is the one between what may be called hard ontological 
inconsistency, involving inconsistency in the very nature of things, and what may be 
called soft inconsistency, which refers to inconsistency easily explainable by 
reference to the variety of perspectives. Hence, when P & ∼P is a soft inconsistency, it 
is quickly seen as no inconsistency at all. Digging just under the surface of things 
reveals that here one is dealing simply with the situation where P is the case for one 
particular perspective while ∼P is the case for another perspective. The inconsistency 
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can be resolved by adjusting the meaning of the words used in expressing P. When, 
however, P & ∼P is a hard inconsistency, no amount of digging deeply will be enough 
to neutralise the situation. 
A standard world view, such as the one of the Tractatus, and of many 
systematic philosophers since Aristotle, is characterised by two laws. The first, the 
law of excluded middle, holds that, of a pair of propositions P and ∼P, at least one 
obtains, a fact classically expressed by the phrase tertium non datur. The second law, 
that of contradiction holds that, of a pair of propositions P and ∼P, at most one 
obtains. These two laws suggest that a non-standard world corresponding to what we 
find in the later writings of Wittgenstein may be one where either the first law fails or 
the second law fails or both.  
Rescher calls the first type of inconsistent world schematic. This world is 
indeterminate at some points, that is, for some points, one can hold neither P nor ∼P. 
There is nothing to say as regards these points. For instance, if we have a world in 
which it can be neither raining nor not raining, then it would be a schematic world. 
The second type of inconsistent world, called simply by Rescher an inconsistent 
world, is one in which the law of contradiction does not hold. Hence here for at least 
one pair of propositions P and ∼P, both propositions hold together simultaneously. If 
our world were such that it could be both raining and not raining at the same time, it 
would have been what Rescher calls an inconsistent world.  
One must recall here that such worlds are underdetermined and 
overdetermined respectively not because of our epistemological limitations. They are 
so because of a characteristic intrinsic to them. Because of this important point, I will 
avoid Rescher’s vocabulary, which is suggestive of epistemological limitations on the 
part of the knower. I will call the first world a perforated world, in the sense that it 
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contains holes that are neither P nor ∼P. The same kind of danger can arise with 
Rescher’s terminology regarding the second kind of world, the one he simply calls 
inconsistent. The major characteristic of this world is that some parts or points of it 
are overdetermined, they can be both P and ∼P. What I suggest here is to call this kind 
of world a superimposed world. It may be helpful to think of such a world as being 
folded over at some edges, the crease representing precisely where both P and ∼P 
hold. 
To work out a plausible containment account of contradictions, one needs to 
be clear at the very start on one important point. This concerns our way of expressing 
ourselves. In all our talk, we are obliged to keep away from self-contradiction. This 
holds also when we attempt to talk about contradictions. What needs to be done, 
therefore, is to distinguish between the truth of P in our world, the world of our 
discourse, and the truth of P in some other world, a possible world, either of the 
perforated type or of the superimposed type. This expresses the possibility of 
speaking intelligently about a world w in which, for some P, P is true in w and also ∼P 
is true in the same w. This ensures that there is no explosion of the type considered 
above. Explosion occurs when we hold that, in some world, it is true that (P & ∼P). 
The perforated or superimposed worlds under consideration are such that we can hold 
that neither P nor ∼P are true for some P, or that both P and ∼P are true for some P. 
The ontological status of P and that of ∼P are considered independent issues, so as to 
block the inference from P and ∼P to the conjunction (P & ∼P). In this way, the 
contradiction is contained. The task of containment is being carried out by the 
complexity of the ontology determining the possible worlds under consideration.  
One may object here by drawing attention to the futility of such a 
consideration, noticing perhaps that the perforated or superimposed possible worlds 
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described above are just fictions, perhaps logically interesting, but empirically non-
existent. To counter such an objection, I will mention some interesting developments 
that may result from the above emancipation of a contained inconsistency. I will 
mention the three that readily come to mind. 
Firstly, the above ‘containment account’ of contradictions can have an 
interesting application in understanding certain developments in the history of natural 
science. Some irresolvable riddles in physics and chemistry have been bypassed 
precisely by assuming that reality is sometimes too deep or complicated to be neatly 
charted by our theoretical descriptions. One may say that, when chemists try to 
describe the structure of the benzene ring as an intermediate form, explained in the 
theory of mesomerism, or of that of Pauling’s resonance theory, their attitude shows a 
tendency to accept a perforated ontology. They are saying that the molecule has 
neither one structure nor its opposite. They may certainly hope to resolve the problem 
later. Their attitude of perseverance with the theory as it is, however, shows that the 
contradiction is considered contained, and not left to contaminate and explode the 
entire edifice. Other examples of an attitude favouring an inconsistent ontology, this 
time a superimposed one, include the one taken by early quantum physicists as 
regards the status of the electron, both a particle and a wave.4 
There remains however the crucial questions whether the actual world is 
perforated or not, and whether the actual world is superimposed or not. When facing a 
theoretical impasse, such as the clash between the particle description and the wave 
description, should one conclude that a discovery has been made about the world, 
namely that it is superimposed precisely at that spot? Or should one take the opposite 
                                                          
4 My point may also be applied perhaps to the attitude expressed in the Bohr interpretation of Quantum 
Mechanics as regards the superposition of the wave-function before collapse. A completely 
instrumentalist interpretation of Quantum Mechanics obviously avoids all such questions by stating 
that there is no reality at all to talk about. I am avoiding this way of interpreting the formalism, 
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view, and conclude that, because of the unacceptable theoretical contradiction, one 
needs to confess one’s ignorance and admit that the full description of that area of the 
real is still to be discovered? It is certainly a mark of light-headedness to go about 
spotting perforations and superimpositions every time there is disagreement. If, 
however, the scientific theories under consideration can prove their mettle elsewhere, 
as in the spectacular case of Quantum Mechanics, then a stubborn contradiction may 
be taken to mean the discovery of a previously unconceived of aspect of the world we 
live in.  
The second possible application of the containment-account of contradictions 
concerns a classic debate in the area of philosophy of religion, namely the one about 
God’s limitations on creating the world. Does God’s omnipotence mean that God can 
even create a square circle? Or is logic a limitation on God’s power? Thomas Aquinas 
defended a position according to which logic reflects ontology so well that limits on 
logic are equivalent to limits on what could be (Summa Theol. I, 25, 3). He concludes 
that God cannot do the impossible. This, for Aquinas, is not a limitation on God’s 
part. René Descartes, on the other hand, argues that the power of God cannot have any 
limits, not even the limits set by the law of non-contradiction. Omnipotence goes 
beyond what is graspable by our finite minds (Lettre au P. Mesland, 2 Mai 1644; cf. 
Hughes 1995, 114-151). As is evident from this paper, Wittgenstein’s line of thinking 
could be developed in a way favouring Descartes’ attitude. It leaves some space, as it 
were, between logic and ontology. His line of thinking seems to lead to the claim that, 
when theologians refer to God by the term mysterium tremendum, they are using these 
terms precisely to keep the door open for a creation whose nature can go beyond our 
                                                                                                                                                                      
because it seems an extreme position difficult to integrate with the rest of natural science. On 
chemistry, see Hooykaas 1999, pp. 257-262. 
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expectations, open even for the possibility that our world may in fact turn out to be 
perforated or superimposed.  
In this context, one may be tempted to refer to Wittgenstein’s famous mention 
of God in dealing with the question whether the group 7777 occurs or does not occur 
in the infinite decimal expansion of π (Wittgenstein 1953, § 352). We often say that 
God sees the entire expansion of π but we do not. Hence, we conclude that the group 
7777 either occurs or does not occur, and that there is no third way. This, however, is 
mistaken. Wittgenstein wants to use this example to make a point about propositions. 
According to him, the mistake lies in the hidden assumption that infinity is a quantity, 
which is false. The question ‘Can God know all the places for the expansion of π?’ is 
senseless because of this assumption. In this section of the Philosophical 
Investigations, Wittgenstein is neither talking about God, nor about what we can say 
about God’s power. He is just uncovering the limits of the very meaning of 
‘proposition’. For him, the principle that every proposition is either true or false 
partially defines what a proposition is. We must recall, however, that the very 
definition of ‘proposition’ has a meaning that is itself embedded in human practice. 
Our assent to the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle show our respect for 
certain practices, we call inexorable.5 The upshot is that, in the line of argument 
followed in this paper, Wittgenstein’s point about 7777 in the expansion of π is not of 
direct relevance. We can still hold that his views on contradiction favour Descartes’ 
position, namely that God’s omnipotence goes beyond what is graspable by our finite 
minds. 
                                                          
5   Cf. Wittgenstein 1967, I, § 118. P.M.S. Hacker insists that Wittgenstein, in Philosophical 
Investigations § 352, was not impugning the validity of the law of excluded middle. In my view, 
this comment is correct, but does not say anything about Wittgenstein’s views on contradiction 
elsewhere in his other writings. Cf. Hacker 1990, pp. 377-379. 
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The third possible application of the containment-account of contradictions 
concerns the intersubjective aspect of knowledge. The limited emancipation of 
contradictions as described above can open up new ways of understanding how living 
with a collective set of beliefs containing some contradictions is not a paralysing 
handicap. The political and social repercussions of this idea could find an echo in the 
way a pluralistic society may find grounds for its cohesion. It is customary to assume 
that cultural cohesion is exclusively dependent on a stock of truths common to all. If 
people concentrate on what they know in common and forget the differences in 
opinion, peace and harmony are guaranteed. What is knowable, however, may turn 
out to be far more complicated than previously admitted by any single sub-group of 
society. The collective set of all beliefs adhered to at any one time will certainly be 
inconsistent a various points. The containment account of contradictions may be 
useful here in viewing such a belief-set less problematic for everyday living than it 
used to be viewed before. 
There is, however, a danger here. It lies in the possibility of arguing that the 
refractive character of belief-systems and of value-systems is to be accepted as it is. 
This is equivalent to holding that belief-systems need no deeper elaboration, no 
further reflection, by the various groups that propose them. Those who hold this view 
often argue that the objective aspect of the world to which such discourse aspires to 
be responsible is either a pure fiction, which leads us back to pure conventionalism, or 
is hopelessly perforated or superimposed. So why should one feel obliged to reach out 
to others, to engage in conversation with those who have another viewpoint? The 
drive towards unity and towards clearer criteria for better living is thus undermined. If 
this were true, society would have no other course to take than the one leading 
towards epistemological fragmentation, or cultural apartheid. This danger should be 
kept in mind, because a heavily perforated world, just as a heavily superimposed one, 
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is as good as no world at all.6 Not everything, therefore, that results from the 
emancipation of contradictions is desirable.  
Is this what Wittgenstein had in mind when discussing contradictions? I am 
not in a position to give a definite answer to this question. In the quotation mentioned 
above, he calls a contradiction ‘a possible regular instrument’ in some language-
games. One may ask: an instrument for what? If my development outlined so far is 
acceptable, the word could be a useful instrument for a number of things. In some 
language-games, especially the ones constrained by exaggerated logical precision, a 
contradiction is used to show a danger of explosion, a dead-end. It is here used to 
constrain the language-game, as a kind of traffic warden: one can go wherever one 
likes as long as this point is avoided. It can also be used to indicate failure in latching 
onto the real world. In other language-games, however, contradiction has a much less 
hostile role. It is used as an instrument to indicate that the ontology being presupposed 
may be of a certain complex kind. It can be used to indicate that there is more to life 
than what can be expressed in precise algorithmic trees, or to indicate that rationality 
goes beyond ratiocination. 
My overall aim was simply to suggest how a plausible ‘containment-account’ 
of inconsistency can be sketched out in line with some of Wittgenstein’s remarks. 
This is one possible direction to take. There may be others. 
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